In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which (...) is sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Biological Sciences. (shrink)

Revised version of lectures delivered by the author on the Sir Hari Singh Gaur Foundation Lectures on Comparative Philosophy, at Saugor University in December 1955.

SS RAMA RAO PAPPU PROFESSOR PT RAJU: EVOLUTION OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT "In India (PT Raju) represents and is really the original initiator of, ...

What MacKinnon offers here is a provocative and original analysis of the meaning of the word "true." His applications are in the areas of statements in general, scientific theories, and theological propositions. One reason for the interest of the book can be found in MacKinnon’s intellectual odyssey. Setting out from a starting-point of standard neo-scholastic textbook philosophy and theology, MacKinnon has come to a highly personal synthesis to which he is willing at least tentatively to apply the label, "ontological pragmatism." (...) Stages along the way—and elements in the synthesis—include Bernard Lonergan’s transcendental Thomism, Wilfrid Sellars’ neo-Kantian version of analytical epistemology, and much detailed work of MacKinnon’s own in analytical philosophy of science. The provocative character of Truth and Expression is likely to bring criticism of the author for misuse of his sources. Wittgensteinian philosophical therapists are likely to bemoan MacKinnon’s relapse into ontologism, even if he qualifies it as a "pragmatic" version. Sellars is likely to object to being lumped with Lonergan, and the latter would probably be upset with the uses to which his former student has put his insights. It may also be worthwhile here to express a demur or two with respect to MacKinnon’s use of his Thomistic sources, e.g., concerning his theory of meaning. It seems that MacKinnon has accepted too naively what might best be called "textbook Thomism." It is true that Aquinas offers a mentalist view, and true also that both Aristotle and Aquinas speak of words as signs of concepts. While this can give rise to a private-language mentalism of the kind Wittgenstein would criticize, it must be recalled that Aristotle and Aquinas were writing not only before Wittgenstein but also before Kant. Whatever can be said of Aquinas’ "mentalism," it is certainly true that in other contexts Aquinas has a social theory of learning that is, at least on the surface, incompatible with a private language theory. Again, with respect to theological truth it seems likely that MacKinnon has been misled by Thomistic manuals, at least when he claims that what Aquinas offers is "a geometrically ordered deductive system" in which "the primacy of Jesus as a revelation of God does not fit." Historical studies of the function of his Summa Theologiae in Aquinas’ scheme for theological education do not support the view of Aquinas as a theological deductive system builder. Nor is it true, as MacKinnon seems to hold, that Aquinas’ view of theological truth is more Aristotelian than biblical. Aside from these qualifications on his use of sources, MacKinnon’s book offers an abundance of critical thinking, analytical insight, and systematic ability. For instance, the reader interested in MacKinnon’s original approach to an adequate epistemology of science will here, in chapter three of Truth and Expression, find the best summary yet of his many contributions in that area. Whether or not, in the last analysis, MacKinnon’s synthesis will be historically significant remains to be seen. What seems likely now is that if it does, the ingredient elements of Lonergen, [[sic]] Sellars, Wittgenstein, Quine, etc., will be more muted, and MacKinnon’s own synthesis will stand on its own. Meanwhile, Truth and Expression will serve as the best guide, pointing in the direction we can expect MacKinnon to follow in the future.—P. T. D. (shrink)

"No other work treating Indian philosophy on a comparable scale contains the illuminating comparisons between doctrines of Indian schools and the thought of Western philosophy ranging from Plato to Sartre and Wittgenstein...It will, moreover, contribute to the understanding of Western philosophy by Indian thinkers and vice versa...Raju has an intimate acquaintance with a remarkable range of Western thinkers and this distinguishes his work from most of what has gone before...Raju, moreover, is himself a critical thinker and consequently, although (...) he has written a history, he treats the ideas and doctrines in a philosophical mode and his assessments of positions are often original and illuminating." -- John E. Smith, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University "Purpose: To deal with Indian philosophy in a fashion reflecting the way the best German historians of philosophy deal with Western philosophy...The book is remarkable for its comprehensiveness in combination with extensive critical discussions...Raju's book...is more critical than Radhakrishnan's and more philosophical than Dasgupta's. Radhakrishnan's comments are far less philosophically sophisticated and interesting than Raju's....a monument to a senior Indian philosopher's lifelong study and thoughtful critical consideration of the great classical systems of his tradition." -- Karl H. Potter, Professor of Philosophy, University of Washington "Raju's credentials are impeccable. He is one of the few scholars in the world who could presume to write a major work on Indian thought. Accordingly, his knowledge of the Indian schools is accurate and impressive. To the extent that one of his intentions is to cast those schools in terms which make them more intelligible to western readers, his work measures up very well." -- Harold H. Oliver, Professor of Philosophy, Boston University. (shrink)

Those philosophers who gave a negative answer to all four questions were called "eel-wrigglers" by the Buddhists. It was impossible to fix their position either for approval or for rejection. They would criticize any view, positive or negative, but would not themselves hold any. And it was difficult for a serious person to enter into any controversy with them.

This volume conveys that Indian philosophy has intricate and complex metaphysical and epistemological theories as other philosophies and that these disciplines – epistemology and metaphysics – are an essential part of Indian philosophy.

The aim of this paper is not to enter into a detailed discussion of the nature of the Absolute and the Individual, but to show that on the Hegelian conception of the Absolute the individual self is not saved. Hegel is fond of reiterating that his Absolute is not a bare one, but a one in many, an organic whole, a perfect and harmonious system of an infinite number of individual selves. The individual, as in Spinoza and Schelling, does not (...) lose itself in the Absolute. The latter is not a lion's den into which all animals enter but from which none returns, not a mere darkness in which all cows are black, but a system of different individuals. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical activity in India is influenced not only by India's traditional philosophy but also by Western Philosophy. One of the results of the introduction, by Macaulay, of the Western system of education into India is the popularization of the study of Western Philosophy, and Indians took to it quite enthusiastically. Sanscrit philosophical texts were at first regarded as sacred, and Europeans could have no access to them. But in time, the prejudice abated, and Sanscrit texts began to be translated (...) into English. At the beginning, the motives behind Western interest in Indian Philosophy were mainly of two kinds: the rulers wanted to understand the culture and religions of the ruled in order to govern them without hurting their religious sentiments, and thus with the least friction; and secondly. Christian missionaries wanted converts and studied the religions and philosophies of the latter in order to find out defects in them and uphold the superiority of Christianity. But whatever be the motives and however biased the scholarship in the beginning, genuine academical interest in the philosophical literature of India came to be evinced, thanks to the work of men like Max Müller, Deussen, Rhys Davids, etc., and vast stores of Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina philosophical literature were unearthed not only in India but also outside. It should, however, be said that academical philosophers of the West did not take serious interest in Indian Philosophy as such; and not a single Indian philosophical concept has entered till now the discussions of Western technical philosophy, Schopenhauer was an exception: he made serious use of the concept of Maya. (shrink)

The problem of the individual has had both logical and metaphysical interest and is as old as Plato in the West and Gautama and Kanäda in the East. It is still a controversial problem for logicians and metaphysicians alike, and is now-a-days complicated by the change in meaning and also by the inherent ambiguity of the terms individual and particular.

The general characteristics of the decades after the last World War, so far as the human situation goes, include two phenomena: these decades are marked by man's dissatisfaction with himself, his confession of ignorance of himself, his anxiety about his future, and also his earnest search for the ground of his being, which can give him a feeling of security with reference to his life here and hereafter; they are also marked by man's pride about his achievements in science and (...) tech nology, a hope of a better life on earth, and a faith in himself as capable of engineering the individual and society for realizing peace, harmony, and happiness for all men. The contemporary thinking man is conscious of the predicament these two kinds of characteristics have created for him, admits failures, hopes for improvements, and works for them. In carrying out this work, he has to and wants to know what human life is, what the meaning and purpose of life are, and why his struggles and achievements have not succeeded in giving every man a reasonable amount of comfort and happiness. He has come to realize also that the accumulation of material comforts does not necessarily lead to happi ness, although happiness for man - except for the monk, fakir, or sannyiisin - is not possible without material comforts. Here we have the problem. (shrink)

In this third and revised edition of the first volume on the philosophy of the Church fathers, Professor Wolfson explores the gradual development of a relationship between faith and reason in the early Church and the subsequent speculation that took place concerning the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. At every step of the way, he gives a most painstaking review of the many divergent opinions held, together with the likely derivations of the technical terms in which these (...) opinions came to be formulated. In the final part, which deals with the anathematized, he shows the sources, both within and without Christianity, of what finally came to be known as heresy. Though this work is not, formally speaking, a theological inquiry, it provides an enormous wealth of textual material and references which the inquiring theologian can hardly afford to overlook.--T. S. P. (shrink)

This work is, in many ways, a tour de force in common sense. For, as Thomas explores his topics, he treads a middle road between the two extremes that await anyone who deals with such subjects. His most valuable contribution in this regard is his insistence that religious experience, qua experience, is a fact of history and had best be treated by the intellectual with as much unprejudiced consideration as he would give to any other kind of experience. But while (...) the sensibleness of this work comes at first like a breath of fresh air in these polarized times, the work as a whole eventually suffers from the great limitation that has always plagued common sense. One wonders what we really learn from being told that Pelagius overstressed man's ability to overcome sin while Augustine understressed it.--T. S. P. (shrink)

It may be seen from the foregoing that Pauline's existence is multiply jeopardized; or rather, that my right to use 'Pauline' as a name, the way I said I was going to, is very doubtful, for I agree with Parmenides that one cannot name what is not there to be named. The words I have used to describe Pauline's various perils are full of what Ryle aptly called "systematically misleading expressions"; but we need not worry about that for the moment-enough (...) for now if the words succeed in bringing the various cases before our minds--and we can tidy up our language as we come to see things more clearly. (shrink)

The author is critical of russell's theory in that his "analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions is very defective" and has too many complications to serve as a "convention for a symbolic language.".

Those familiar with Whitehead's thought may wish to skim Part One: Background and Foundations and pass on to Part Two: Value Theory in General and in Particular, which is Weisenbeck's main contribution to the literature on Whitehead. In discussing the general theory, Weisenbeck calls attention to the relational character of value. He argues that Whitehead's worlds of possible and realized values are essentially related; neither has value apart from the other. Similarly, value is neither wholly in subjects nor wholly in (...) objects; it is a relationship between the valuing subject and the valuable object. The author divides Whitehead's value theory into three principal species: aesthetic, religious, and moral. The chapter on aesthetic values contains a careful examination of Whitehead's distinction between appearance and reality and an analysis of beauty as the highest value. In the section on religious values he discusses man's relationship to God and man's emotional and volitional response to the religious vision of unity and perfection. Of special interest is the section on moral values where Weisenbeck shows the connection between morality and the aesthetic ideals to be attained. In view of his emphasis on ideals and the role of love in human action Weisenbeck would presumably side against those who have attributed a private interest theory to Whitehead. The author has performed an important service in sorting out the various senses of value terms in Whitehead and in tracing their relationships.--T. P. A. (shrink)

The author states: "in a recent article searle has shown the odd irrelevance of russell's criticisms of frege in the famous paper 'on denoting'. I here offer an explanation of the oddity: russell had excusably, But wrongly, Conflated frege's distinction between sinn and bedeutung with his own distinction between what an expression 'means' and what it 'denotes'.".

On his very first page Feldman ascribes to me a claim about the relation expressed by 'is identical with'. Feldman's way of speaking is, as Ryle might say, systematically misleading: for of course I deny that any one relation, even a relative relation, is the relation expressed by 'is identical with'. My whole thesis was that 'is identical with' expressed now one, now another, relation, according to the context of utterance.

This study attempts to highlight and clarify the central themes in four important theoretical perspectives on the nature of war and the international order. Perhaps because it is an enlarged version of the Wiles lectures, the book is written with a refreshing verve and fluent, relaxed elegance—purchased at the cost of some redundancy and lack of crispness. The bulk of the work consists of four largely independent essays, each dealing with a single thinker or outlook. The essay dealing with Marx (...) and Engels is the most helpful and rich: by focusing on Engels’s voluminous but hitherto neglected military writings, Gallie is able to shed intriguing new light on the revolutionary strategy of the founders of Marxism. It is perhaps not surprising that the most ambitious chapter theoretically, the one on Kant, is the least satisfactory. The author offers a sensible corrective to many misreadings of Kant’s political works and presents a fairly accurate overview of Kant’s internationalist program. But because Gallie fails to take into account either the crucial Kantian concept of the State of Nature or the basic Kantian distinction between virtue and justice, the real difficulties tend to be glossed over, and Kant is made to seem rather less hardheaded, and more moralistic, than he in fact is. (shrink)